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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
INTRODUCTION 
The government appeals the District Court’s 
determination at sentencing that Juan Ramos is not a “career 
offender” under Section 4B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.  That determination was based on the conclusion 
that Ramos’s prior state court conviction for aggravated 
assault is not a predicate “crime of violence,” as that term is 
defined in the Guidelines.  We disagree with that conclusion.  
Applying the modified categorical approach to 
Pennsylvania’s divisible aggravated assault statute, we hold 
that Ramos’s prior conviction for second-degree aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. 
§ 2702(a)(4), is categorically a crime of violence.  Because 
the District Court did not designate Ramos a career offender 
for sentencing purposes, we will vacate the judgment of 
sentence and remand for resentencing.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Ramos’s status as a career offender is dictated by his 
criminal record, which includes several prior felony 
convictions.  First, in July 1998, Ramos “threw a brick at the 
nose of a 10-year-old child,” who then required medical 
treatment at a local hospital.1  As a result, Ramos pled guilty 
                                              
1 2010 Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) & 2017 PSR 
¶ 40.  Although we set out Ramos’s prior offense conduct by 
way of background, the categorical approach requires courts 
to ignore an offender’s conduct and analyze only the elements 
of the statute of conviction.  See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 2245, 2253 (2016).   
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to aggravated assault in the Philadelphia County Common 
Pleas Court.2  Second, in October 1999, Ramos was 
apprehended with 2.76 grams of heroin and subsequently 
convicted in state court for manufacturing, delivering, or 
possessing with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled 
substance, and knowingly possessing a controlled substance.3  
And third, in August 2001, Ramos broke into a furniture store 
and stole “several futons”; he later pled guilty to burglary in 
state court.4   
 
The instant offense conduct occurred in January 2008, 
when Philadelphia police officers observed Ramos selling 
crack cocaine out of a truck.5  The police arrested Ramos and 
recovered a loaded handgun from the vehicle.  A federal 
grand jury indicted Ramos for various drug and weapons 
offenses in November 2008.6  One year later, Ramos pled 
                                              
2 2010 PSR & 2017 PSR ¶ 38.  As discussed below, the bill 
of information and plea documents, which we can consider 
only if we apply the modified categorical approach, establish 
that Ramos pled guilty to second-degree aggravated assault 
with a deadly weapon, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 
2702(a)(4).  See Supp. App. 6-7. 
3 2010 PSR & 2017 PSR ¶¶ 41-42.   
4 2010 PSR & 2017 PSR ¶¶ 43, 45.   
5 2010 PSR & 2017 PSR ¶¶ 12-15. 
6 Ramos was charged with: (i) possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine base and aiding and abetting, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; (ii) 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 
crime and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
924(c), (2); and (iii) possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  See 2010 PSR & 
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guilty to each of the charged offenses, stipulating in his plea 
agreement that he was a career offender.7   
At sentencing, the District Court concluded that 
Ramos had three predicate drug or violent felony convictions 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—the three 
state court convictions set out above—and was thus subject to 
a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.  Factoring in 
Ramos’s acceptance of responsibility, the District Court 
determined that Ramos’s effective Guidelines range was 248-
to-295 months’ imprisonment—i.e., an advisory Guidelines 
range of 188-to-235 months’ imprisonment combined with a 
mandatory, consecutive 60-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c).8  After granting the government’s motion for a 
downward departure, the court sentenced Ramos to a 180-
month term of imprisonment. 
 
  In May 2016, Ramos sought post-conviction relief 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that, under Johnson v. 
United States (Johnson II),9 his prior burglary conviction was 
no longer a career offender predicate and, therefore, his 
career-offender designation and sentence were invalid.  Both 
                                                                                                     
2017 PSR ¶ 1.  In addition, the government filed an 
information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, charging Ramos 
with a Notice of Prior Conviction.  See 2010 PSR & 2017 
PSR ¶ 2.   
7 See 2010 PSR ¶¶ 1-6, 22-31.      
8 These figures were based on a determination that Ramos’s 
Total Offense Level was a 31 and that he was a career 
offender with a Category VI criminal history.  2010 PSR 
¶¶ 22-31, 67-70.  
9 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (striking down the “residual 
clause” of the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague).    
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the government and the District Court agreed that Ramos’s 
sentence was invalid under Johnson II.10  Accordingly, the 
District Court vacated Ramos’s sentence and held a 
resentencing hearing in July 2017.   
Although the government conceded that Ramos was 
not a career offender under the ACCA, it nonetheless took the 
position at resentencing that Ramos remained a career 
offender under the Guidelines—which require only two 
predicate drug or violent felony convictions, as opposed to 
the three convictions required by the ACCA.11  The 
government thus recommended that the court again impose a 
180-month sentence.  Ramos countered that he was not a 
career offender under the Guidelines because his prior 
aggravated assault conviction was not a predicate crime of 
violence.  Proceeding from that premise, Ramos contended 
that his effective Guidelines range was 97-to-106 months’ 
imprisonment.12  The District Court adopted Ramos’s 
proposed Guidelines calculation, ruling from the bench that 
Ramos was not a career offender because there was doubt as 
to whether aggravated assault under Pennsylvania law 
qualifies as a crime of violence.13  Having concluded that 
Ramos was not a career offender, the District Court sentenced 
Ramos to a 105-month term of imprisonment—more than six 
                                              
10 Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 56 (granting joint motion for § 2255 
relief).   
11 Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).   
12 This calculation was based on a determination that, after 
excluding the ACCA enhancement or any consideration of his 
prior aggravated assault conviction, Ramos had a Total 
Offense Level of 17 and a Category IV criminal history.   
13 App. 60-61 (transcript of resentencing).     
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years less than his initial sentence and the sentence 
recommended by the government.   
 
In September 2017, the government appealed the 
District Court’s conclusion that Ramos was not a career 
offender under the Guidelines.  Several days after the 
government filed its opening brief, the District Court issued a 
memorandum, reiterating its position that Ramos was not a 
career offender on the ground that his aggravated assault 
conviction was not a crime of violence, but disavowing its 
earlier rationale for that conclusion.14   
 
DISCUSSION15 
The sole issue we must resolve on appeal is whether 
Ramos is a career offender under Section 4B1.1 of the 
Guidelines.  Ramos argues that he is not a career offender—a 
designation that applies only to defendants with at least two 
predicate drug or violent felony convictions16—because only 
one of his prior felony convictions (i.e., his 1999 drug 
                                              
14 Supp. App. 1-5 (“The Court acknowledges that it erred in 
relying on the rule of lenity . . ..”).  
15 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s legal determination that 
Ramos is not a career offender.  United States v. Chapman, 
866 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2017).  
16 See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).     
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conviction) qualifies as a career offender predicate.17  
According to Ramos, his 1998 aggravated assault conviction 
cannot qualify as a career offender predicate since it is not a 
“crime of violence” within the meaning of the Guidelines.  
The government, by contrast, argues that Ramos is a career 
offender because his aggravated assault conviction was for a 
crime of violence.  To resolve this appeal, we must determine 
whether Ramos’s 1998 aggravated assault conviction 
qualifies as a predicate crime of violence under the 
Guidelines.  
 
I.  Legal Framework:  Career Offender Status, 
Crimes of Violence, and the Categorical and Modified 
Categorical Approaches 
 
A. The Career Offender and Crime of Violence 
Provisions of the Guidelines 
 
Under the Guidelines, a defendant is designated a 
“career offender” and thus subject to enhanced sentencing 
exposure if, as relevant here, “the defendant has at least two 
prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense.”18  Because the parties agree 
that Ramos’s 1999 drug conviction is a predicate controlled 
substance offense, Ramos is a career offender so long as his 
prior aggravated assault conviction is a predicate crime of 
violence.   
                                              
17 It is undisputed that Ramos’s 1999 state court drug 
conviction qualifies as a career offender predicate “controlled 
substance offense.”  See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). 
18 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a); see United States v. Graves, 877 
F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 2017).   
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Section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines sets out two separate 
definitions of the term “crime of violence.”  Any federal or 
state offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment 
exceeding one year, is a crime of violence if the offense: 
 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person 
of another, or 
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, 
aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, 
arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession 
of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or 
explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
841(c).19 
The first definition is known as the “elements clause,” and the 
second definition is known as the “enumerated offenses 
clause.”20    
 
B.  The Categorical and Modified Categorical 
Approaches   
 
 To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a 
predicate crime of violence, courts use the categorical 
approach or, when applicable, the modified categorical 
approach.  Both approaches require us to “compare the 
                                              
19 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 
20 See United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 
2018).  Because we hold that Ramos’s aggravated assault 
conviction is a crime of violence under the elements clause, 
we do not address the enumerated offenses clause.    
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elements of the statute under which the defendant was 
convicted to the [G]uidelines’ definition of crime of 
violence.”21  When conducting that analysis under the 
elements clause, as here, we ask whether the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against another person 
is categorically an element of the offense of conviction.22  If 
the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction 
necessarily has such an element, then the statute proscribes a 
predicate crime of violence within the meaning of the 
Guidelines.23  But if the statute of conviction lacks such an 
element, it “sweeps more broadly” than the Guidelines’ 
definition, and a prior conviction under the statute cannot 
serve as a career offender predicate—even if the defendant 
actually committed the offense by using, attempting to use, or 
threatening to use physical force against another person.24 
 
It may appear counterintuitive that a defendant who 
actually uses physical force against another person when 
committing a felony does not, by definition, commit a violent 
                                              
21 Wilson, 880 F.3d at 83 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Chapman, 866 F.3d at 133 (quoting Descamps v. 
United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013)); see United States v. 
Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining the 
various rationales for the categorical approach).   
22 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); see Chapman, 866 F.3d at 134 
(quoting United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 
2014)); see also United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 
1415 (2014). 
23 Chapman, 866 F.3d at 134.  
24 Brown, 765 F.3d at 189 (citing Descamps, 570 U.S. at 
261); Chapman, 866 F.3d at 134; see Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2251-52. 
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crime under the elements clause.  But that outcome is dictated 
by the categorical approach, which is concerned only with the 
elements of the statute of conviction, not the specific offense 
conduct of an offender.25  In fact, the categorical approach 
requires courts not only to ignore the actual manner in which 
the defendant committed the prior offense, but also to 
presume that the defendant did so by engaging in no more 
than “the minimum conduct criminalized by the state 
statute.”26  This academic focus on a hypothetical offender’s 
hypothetical conduct is not, however, an “invitation to apply 
legal imagination” to the statute of conviction.27  Rather, there 
must be legal authority establishing that there is “a realistic 
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would 
apply its statute to conduct” falling outside of the Guidelines’ 
definition of a crime of violence.28   
 
This elements-only analysis is confined to the statute 
of conviction.  If, however, that statute is “divisible,” a court 
may resort to the “modified categorical approach.”29  Serving 
as a tool that “merely helps implement the categorical 
approach,” the modified categorical approach allows a court 
                                              
25 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251-52; Taylor v. United States, 
495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
26 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013); see 
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253 (explaining that the categorical 
approach “treats such facts as irrelevant”).  
27 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).     
28 See id.  
29 Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257, 262 (explaining that a statute 
is divisible if it “comprises multiple, alternative versions of 
the crime”).   
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to look beyond the statute of conviction for a limited purpose, 
but “is not meant to supplement the categorical approach.”30  
In the case of a “divisible” statute, the court may consult a 
specific set of extra-statutory documents to identify the 
specific statutory offense that provided the basis for the prior 
conviction.  These materials include the “charging document, 
written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any 
explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the 
defendant assented.”31  This approach permits the court to 
assess whether that offense categorically qualifies as a crime 
of violence.32  While the modified categorical approach 
allows courts to look beyond the text of a divisible statute for 
that limited purpose, it does not permit courts to scour the 
record to ascertain the factual conduct giving rise to the prior 
conviction.33  
 
II.  Ramos Is a Career Offender Because His 
Aggravated Assault Conviction Is Categorically a 
Crime of Violence Under the Guidelines  
In light of the foregoing legal framework, we can 
resolve whether Ramos is a career offender by answering 
three questions.  Is Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute 
divisible?  If so, does the limited set of extra-statutory 
materials that we may consult under the modified categorical 
                                              
30 Robinson, 844 F.3d at 143 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
    31 Brown, 765 F.3d at 189-90 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
602; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005)).   
32 Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263-64; see Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2256.   
33 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253-54.  
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approach establish with certainty which subsection of 
Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute provided the basis 
for Ramos’s conviction?  And, if so, does that specific 
aggravated assault offense categorically qualify as a predicate 
crime of violence under the Guidelines?  Because we answer 
each of those questions in the affirmative, we conclude that 
Ramos is a career offender.   
A. Pennsylvania’s Aggravated Assault Statute Is 
Divisible  
The presentence investigation reports (PSRs) state that, 
in 1998, Ramos pled guilty in Pennsylvania court to 
aggravated assault, without specifying the aggravated assault 
offense that he committed.34  Accordingly, we must begin our 
categorical analysis by examining the text of Pennsylvania’s 
aggravated assault statute, 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702, which at the 
time of Ramos’s guilty plea provided as follows:  
 
(a)  Offense defined.—A person is guilty of aggravated 
assault if he: 
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 
another or causes such injury intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life; 
(2) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to any of 
the officers agents, employees or other persons 
enumerated in subsection (c) [listing twenty-six 
protected classes of individuals, including police 
                                              
34 2010 PSR & 2017 PSR ¶ 38.   
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officers, firefighters, judges, prosecutors, and other 
public officials], or to an employee of an agency, 
company or other entity engaged in public 
transportation, while in the performance of duty. 
(3) attempts to cause or intentionally or 
knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the 
officers, agents, employees or other persons 
enumerated in subsection (c), in the performance of 
duty;  
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or 
knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon;  
(5) attempts to cause or intentionally or 
knowingly causes bodily injury to a teaching staff 
member, school board member, or other employee 
or student of [various educational institutions]; or 
(6) attempts by physical menace to put any of the 
officers, agents, employees or other persons 
enumerated in subsection (c), while in the 
performance of duty, in fear of imminent serious 
bodily injury.35 
                                              
35 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(1)-(6) (1998); see id. § 2301 
(defining “Deadly weapon,” “Bodily injury,” and “Serious 
bodily injury”); see also id. § 901(a) (defining “attempt”).  
Because, “[u]nder the categorical approach, we look to the 
elements of the statute as it existed at the time of the prior 
conviction,” United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 355 (3d Cir. 
15 
 
Under the statute’s grading provision, 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(b), 
convictions under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are classified 
as first-degree felonies, while convictions under subsections 
(a)(3) through (a)(6) are second-degree felonies.  Offenders 
convicted of first-degree aggravated assault are subject to 
lengthier maximum sentences than their counterparts 
convicted of second-degree aggravated assault.36  
 
 The PSRs setting out Ramos’s criminal history state 
only that he pled guilty to aggravated assault and therefore do 
not enable us to discern the specific subsection of § 2702(a) 
providing the basis for his guilty plea.  If Pennsylvania’s 
aggravated assault statute is divisible, however, we may apply 
the modified categorical approach to fill that gap in the 
record.37   
 
A determination of a statute’s divisibility turns on the 
distinction between “means” and “elements.”  Elements are 
the constituent parts of a criminal offense that a jury must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict; or, alternatively, 
that a defendant necessarily admits when pleading guilty.38  
Means, on the other hand, are merely the factual ways that a 
criminal offense can be committed; they are “extraneous to 
                                                                                                     
2016), we confine our analysis to the version of the statute in 
effect in 1998.    
36 18 Pa. C.S. § 1103(1)-(2) (allowing courts to sentence an 
offender convicted of a first-degree felony to “not more than 
20 years,” and an offender convicted of a second-degree 
felony to “not more than ten years”).   
37 See, e.g., Brown, 765 F.3d at 191.   
38 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, 2256; see Descamps, 570 U.S. 
at 261-62.   
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the crime’s legal requirements” and thus “need neither be 
found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant.”39  A divisible 
statute sets out one or more elements in the alternative, most 
often using disjunctive language to list multiple, alternative 
criminal offenses.40  Each alternative offense listed in a 
divisible statute must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to 
sustain a conviction.  An indivisible statute, by comparison, 
sets forth a single set of elements that define a single crime, 
regardless of whether the statute lists separate factual means 
of satisfying a particular element.41  The modified categorical 
approach applies only to divisible statutes.  
 
Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute, 18 Pa. C.S. 
§ 2702, is divisible in two different ways.  For one, the statute 
proscribes two alternative degrees of aggravated assault, 
which are subject to different maximum sentences.42  The 
Supreme Court has held that where “statutory alternatives 
carry different punishments then, under Apprendi, they must 
be elements” (i.e., separate, divisible offenses), not means.43  
That is because any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
(other than the fact of a prior conviction) must be submitted 
to a jury.44  Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute sets out 
divisible forms of aggravated assault:  first- and second-
                                              
39 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248.  
40 Descamps, 570 U.S. at 262.   
41 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248-49.  
42 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 1103(1)-(2), 2702(b). 
43 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (citing Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).      
44 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.     
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degree aggravated assault.45  Moreover, the statute is further 
divisible into four, alternative second-degree aggravated 
assault offenses.  Using disjunctive language, the statute lists 
alternative “elements”—subsections (a)(3), (4), (5), and (6)—
not merely alternative factual means by which an offender 
can commit the single, overarching crime of second-degree 
aggravated assault.46  Put differently, each subsection of § 
2702(a) criminalizes different conduct and sets forth different 
                                              
45 The parties skip this initial step in the divisibility 
analysis.  They overlook the first-degree provisions of the 
statute entirely and ask us to assume that Ramos was 
convicted of second-degree aggravated assault—even though 
the PSRs stated only that Ramos was convicted of 
“aggravated assault.”  2010 PSR & 2017 PSR ¶ 38.  From the 
PSRs, we have no way of knowing whether Ramos was 
convicted of first- or second-degree aggravated assault unless 
we examine the bill of information and plea document, which 
we can do only if the statute is divisible.  By skipping this 
step, the parties overlook that the modified categorical 
approach applies here. 
 The fact that the aggravated assault statute is divisible 
into first- and second-degree offenses alone would permit us 
to review the bill of information and plea document to 
determine the specific subsection of § 2702(a) to which 
Ramos pled guilty.  See United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 
225-26 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Brown, 765 F.3d at 196.     
46 See, e.g., Brown, 765 F.3d at 192 (holding that 
Pennsylvania’s similarly disjunctive terroristic threats statute, 
18 Pa. C.S. § 2706(a), is divisible).    
18 
 
(albeit overlapping) elements that must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.47   
 
Ramos resists the application of the modified 
categorical approach by citing two non-precedential state 
court decisions, Commonwealth v. Cassell48 and 
Commonwealth v. Moore.49  Ramos argues that these cases 
stand for the proposition that § 2702(a) lists indivisible 
means, not elements, because juries in Pennsylvania do not 
need to agree unanimously on which subsection of the 
second-degree aggravated assault statute has been violated.  
We are not persuaded that these cases “definitively” answer 
the question of divisibility.50, 51  To the contrary, various 
                                              
47 See PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 15.2702A-15.2702L (Pa. Bar. Inst., 
3d ed. 2016) (listing the elements of each of the separate 
offenses listed in § 2702(a) and instructing that the jury “must 
find that each of [those] elements has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt”).   
48 No. 1300 EDA 2015, 2016 WL 6135379 (Pa. Super. Oct. 
21, 2016). 
49 No. 1247 EDA 2013, 2015 WL 7078781 (Pa. Super. June 
4, 2015). 
50 These cases stand only for the long-standing rule that 
Pennsylvania courts will not overturn a guilty verdict based 
on a flawed (or imprecise) criminal information that 
nonetheless provided the defendant with sufficient notice of 
the nature of the charges.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 
912 A.3d 268, 289 (Pa. 2006).  Neither decision can be read 
as tacit approval of the imprecision in the underlying charging 
documents. 
19 
 
Pennsylvania authorities establish that § 2702(a) lists 
divisible aggravated assault offenses in the alternative, not 
merely alternative means of committing aggravated assault.52   
We conclude that § 2702(a) is divisible.  Thus, we will 
apply the modified categorical approach.  
 
B. Ramos Pled Guilty to Second-Degree 
Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon, in 
Violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(4) 
 The defining feature of the modified categorical 
approach is that it allows courts to consult certain extra-
statutory materials for the limited purpose of identifying the 
offense of conviction—here, the specific subsection of § 
2702(a) that provided the basis for Ramos’s guilty plea.  
These materials must establish the offense of conviction with 
“certainty.”53   
                                                                                                     
51 See United States v. Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 628 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  
52 See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 15.2702A-15.2702L; 
Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 8 A.3d 912, 918 (Pa. Super. 2010) 
(concluding that the offenses listed in § 2702(a)(1) and (a)(4) 
do “not share identical statutory elements” because the latter 
requires proving that the offender caused injury or attempted 
to cause injury “with a deadly weapon” (citing 
Commonwealth v. Ferrari, 593 A.2d 846, 848-49 (Pa. Super. 
1991)); Commonwealth. v. Taylor, 500 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 
Super. 1985) (“[T]he proof required for subsection (a)(1) and 
subsection (a)(4) [of § 2702] is substantially different . . ..”).   
53 Henderson, 841 F.3d at 631-32 (citing Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2257). 
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Despite Ramos’s efforts to inject ambiguity into the 
record, the charging and plea documents plainly establish that 
he pled guilty to second-degree aggravated assault with a 
deadly weapon, in violation of § 2702(a)(4).  The bill of 
information charges Ramos with two offenses:  first-degree 
aggravated assault, in violation of § 2702(a)(1); and second-
degree aggravated assault, in violation of § 2702(a)(4).54  The 
information cites these specific subsections of the statute and 
sets out the charges using the exact language of those 
provisions.  The plea document states, “Guilty as F2,” which 
in widely understood prosecutorial parlance means that 
Ramos pled guilty to a second-degree felony.55  Viewing both 
documents in tandem, then, we are left with only one 
conclusion:  Ramos pled guilty to the only second-degree 
felony with which he was charged, namely, second-degree 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of 
§ 2702(a)(4).    
 
 C. Second-Degree Aggravated Assault with a 
Deadly Weapon, in Violation of § 2702(a)(4), Is 
a Crime of Violence Under the Elements Clause 
Having identified the offense of conviction, we 
examine the elements of that offense to determine whether it 
categorically qualifies as a predicate crime of violence.  We 
                                              
54 Supp. App. 7.  The criminal information further clarifies 
that the “deadly weapon” used during the commission of the 
§ 2702(a)(4) offense was “a brick.”  Id.  
55 Supp. App. 6; see generally Commonwealth v. Spruill, 80 
A.3d 453, 455 (Pa. 2013) (explaining that “F1s” are first-
degree felonies and “F2s” are second-degree felonies).  
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now hold that a § 2702(a)(4) conviction is categorically a 
crime of violence under the elements clause of the 
Guidelines.   
 
 The elements clause defines the term “crime of 
violence” to encompass any state offense that “has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.”56  The phrase “physical 
force,” according to the Supreme Court, “refers to force 
exerted by and through concrete bodies” that is “capable of 
causing physical pain or injury to another person.”57  
Accordingly, a crime is a violent one under the elements 
clause so long as it has an element that can be satisfied only 
through the use, threatened use, or attempted use of force 
against another person that is capable of causing that person 
physical pain or injury.58  That remains true regardless of 
whether an offender could be convicted under the statute for 
applying force directly (e.g., hitting a victim with a bat) or 
applying force indirectly (e.g., throwing a brick at a victim).59    
  
                                              
56 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).  Additionally, any offense must 
be a felony “punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year” to qualify as a “crime of violence.” Id.  It 
is undisputed, however, that § 2702(a)(4) is a second-degree 
felony offense subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of 
ten years.  See 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 1103, 2702(b).   
57 Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 138-
40 (2010); see Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410. 
58 See Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 138-43; see also Castleman, 
134 S. Ct. at 1412 (“Minor uses of force may not constitute 
‘violence’ in the generic sense.”). 
59 Chapman, 866 F.3d at 132-33. 
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Armed with that interpretation of the elements clause, 
we can examine the text of § 2702(a)(4) and readily conclude 
that second-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon 
categorically involves the use or attempted use of physical 
force.  Section § 2702(a)(4) criminalizes “attempt[ing] to 
cause or intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to 
another with a deadly weapon.”60  “Bodily injury” is 
statutorily defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or 
substantial pain.”61  And “deadly weapon” is defined to 
include any firearm, device “designed as a weapon and 
capable of producing death or seriously bodily injury,” or 
device or instrument used in a manner “calculated or likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury.”62  Taken together, the 
“minimum conduct” sufficient to sustain a § 2702(a)(4) 
conviction is an attempt to cause another person to experience 
substantial pain with a device capable of causing serious 
bodily injury.63  As a practical and legal matter, an offender 
can do so only by attempting to use physical force against 
another person.64  Because § 2702(a)(4) categorically has 
                                              
60 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(4); see also id. § 901 (defining 
“criminal attempt”).   
61 Id. § 2301.  
62 Id.  
63 PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS §§ 15.2702E-15.2702F (Pa. Bar. Inst., 3d ed. 
2016); see Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 (requiring courts to 
assume the conviction rested on the “minimum conduct 
criminalized by the state statute”). 
64 Chapman, 866 F.3d at 133; see Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 
1416-17 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is impossible to cause 
bodily injury without using force ‘capable of’ producing that 
result.” (quoting Johnson I, 559 U.S. at 140)). 
23 
 
“physical force” as an element, a prior § 2702(a)(4) 
conviction is a crime of violence.  
 
This conclusion is dictated by the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in United States v. Castleman—a case 
involving statutory language that is identical (in relevant part) 
to the language at issue here.  There, the defendant pled guilty 
to “having ‘intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury’ 
to the mother of his child.”65  The question on appeal, as here, 
was whether that conviction “necessarily had, as an element, 
the use or attempted use of physical force.”66  Answering that 
question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court explained that 
a conviction under a statute proscribing “the knowing or 
intentional causation of bodily injury” is a conviction that 
“necessarily involves the use of physical force.”67  That 
analysis establishes here that second-degree aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon, which similarly requires 
proving the attempted, knowing, or intentional causation of 
bodily injury, is categorically a violent crime.          
   
In response, Ramos relies on Commonwealth v. 
Thomas to argue that aggravated assault under Pennsylvania 
law does not necessarily involve the use, threatened use, or 
attempted use of force.68  In Thomas, the defendant starved 
her four-year-old son to death and was subsequently 
convicted of first-degree aggravated assault, in violation of 
                                              
65 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1409. 
66 Id. at 1413-14 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
67 Id. at 1414 (emphasis added); see Chapman, 866 F.3d at 
133 (applying the Castleman standard when determining if a 
defendant is a career offender under the Guidelines).  
68 867 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. 2005). 
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§ 2702(a)(1).  In denying her challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting her conviction, the Superior Court 
observed that “evidence of the use of force or the threat of 
force is not an element of the crime of aggravated assault.”69  
Focusing on that quote and the defendant’s offense conduct in 
Thomas, Ramos argues that his conviction is not a crime of 
violence because the aggravated assault statute allows for 
conviction based merely on inaction (e.g., child neglect), and 
thus does not require any affirmative act of physical force.  
But there is a fatal flaw in that reasoning:  Thomas has no 
bearing on the issue of whether second-degree aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon is a crime of violence because 
Thomas addressed only a conviction for first-degree 
aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(1)—a wholly separate 
criminal offense containing materially different elements than 
the offense at issue here.70  Ramos cites no authorities 
establishing that an offender’s inaction alone would be 
sufficient to sustain a § 2702(a)(4) conviction.  And it is 
nearly impossible to conceive of a scenario in which a person 
could knowingly or intentionally injure, or attempt to injure, 
                                              
69 Thomas, 867 A.2d at 597.   
70 Id.; see Rhoads, 8 A.3d at 918.  Unlike § 2702(a)(4), the 
first-degree aggravated assault provision at issue in Thomas 
does not require the use of a deadly weapon and allows for 
conviction where a person, inter alia, “attempts to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury . . . 
recklessly under the circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.”  18 Pa. C.S. 
§ 2702(a)(1) (emphasis added).   
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another person with a deadly weapon without engaging in at 
least some affirmative, forceful conduct.71  
    
For these reasons, we conclude that Ramos’s prior 
conviction for second-degree aggravated assault with a deadly 
weapon, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(4), is 
categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause of 
the Guidelines. 
D. Ramos Is a Career Offender Under the 
Guidelines 
 
The foregoing analysis establishes that the District 
Court erred by concluding that Ramos was not a career 
offender under Section 4B1.1 of the Guidelines—a 
conclusion that resulted in a miscalculation of Ramos’s 
advisory Guidelines range.72  The parties agree that Ramos’s 
1999 drug conviction is a predicate controlled substance 
offense, and we have concluded that Ramos’s prior 
aggravated assault conviction is a predicate crime of violence.  
Ramos therefore should have been designated a career 
offender for sentencing purposes.   
 
CONCLUSION 
                                              
71 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 (admonishing that the 
categorical approach is not an “invitation to use legal 
imagination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).    
72 Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (providing that a “career 
offender’s criminal history category in every case . . . shall be 
Category VI”), with App. 63 (determining at sentencing that 
Ramos had a Category IV criminal history).  
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The U.S. Sentencing Commission has concluded that 
offenders with at least two drug or violent felony convictions 
should be subject to sentences that reflect the seriousness of 
their past criminal conduct.  Although faithful application of 
the categorical approach at times results in outcomes that 
frustrate this policy objective,73 our holding today does not:  
Ramos is a career offender because his prior conviction for 
second-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in 
violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(4), is categorically a 
predicate crime of violence.  Because the District Court’s 
calculation of Ramos’s advisory Guidelines range did not 
reflect his career-offender status, we will vacate the judgment 
of sentence and remand for resentencing. 
                                              
73 See e.g., Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (explaining that the court’s holding is “a stark 
illustration of the arbitrary and inequitable results produced 
by applying an elements based approach to this sentencing 
scheme”); Chapman, 866 F.3d at 134 (Jordan, J., concurring) 
(critiquing this aspect of the categorical approach); United 
States v. Faust, 853 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2017) (Lynch, J., 
concurring) (same); United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 
982-83 (9th Cir. 2016) (Watford, J., concurring) (similar).  
